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INTRODUCTION
Until the establishment of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)1~ fish outside the
United States~ twelve mile fishery zone were~ according to
international law, common property and belonged to the
nation or individual that caught them. This common
property law was based on the concept that fish resources
were so large that no amount of fishing would interfere
with the right of others to catch fish. Modern
technology~ however, has created equipment that enabled
foreign and domestic fishermen to over-fish the resource.
A reduced domestic catch led coastal fishermen to support
a bill that unilaterally extended the United States
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles.
Before the FCMA~ the distant water fleets of the
United States and foreign nations took advantage of the
common property status of fish and operated off the coasts
of other nations. For example, the United States tuna
fleet follows tuna into waters adjacent to many nations.
The U.S. tuna fishermen were fearful of a U.S. unilateral
extension to a 200 mile fishing zone triggering foreign
extensions eliminating their traditional fishing grounds.
1The
is known
FCMA, and
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
as the 200 Mile Bill~ the 200 Mile Limit~ the
Public Law 94-265 (hereafter cited as the FCMA).
In order to
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reduce the objections of the tuna fleet~
Congress decided to manage all fishing except highly
migratory species, such as tuna. With this one political
concession, the coastal fishermen were able to get
Congress to pass a bill that gives priority fishing rights
to U.S. fishermen on the basis of nationality.
Many domestic fishermen supported this bill because
they believed that foreign fishing would be stopped and
that the domestic fleet could then catch fish without
interference or regulation. Congress had different ideas.
It declared that fish --a renewable resource providing
income for the economy~ food for the nation~ and
recreation for sportsmen-- have been threatened through
uncontrolled fishing. It felt that catches should be
managed to promote the recovery of the stocks and full
utilization of the underfished species2. Congress also
observed that because both foreign and domestic fishing
caused the problem~ fisheries should be regulated on a
domestic as well as international level3. Although the
FCMA is not supposed to discriminate among domestic
fishermen, there clearly is the possibility of
discrimination when an unequal allocation of wealth
2FCMA Sec.2 Findings, purposes and policy.
3FCMA Sec.2 Findings~ purposes and policy. U.S.,
Committee on Commerce~ A Legislative History of the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976~ p.363.
p.370. (hereafter cited as Legislative History).
occurs.
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For example, the months of peak harvest for cod
fish are different for each state in New England, so a cod
fish closure has a greater economic impact on the state
whose peak fishing coincides with the closure.
In the FCMA there are Seven National Standards
including Standard Four which prohibits discrimination
between residents of different states. Some of the
potential management techniques cause the management
burden to fallon one group of residents and not another.
This burden may be discriminatory and prohibited by
Standard Four or the regional councils should at least be
aware that they are not treating all residents the same.
Although Standard Four is legally no more important than
the others, it is the topic of this thesis.
In order to discuss potential violations of "Standard
Four" or the economic consequences of fisheries management
on fishermen from different states it is necessary to
understand six points:
(3) the optimum yield from a fishery,
stocks of fish,
through management,
(2)
(1) which institutions manage the
what objectives could be reached
(4) the stock assessment methods, (5) the management
techniques available,
occur.
(6) and how discrimination could
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CHAPTER I. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter deals with the local, state, and federal
fisheries managers, and their activities in the fisheries
zone set up by the FCMA. The three national departments
that have a role in managing the fish are the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the
Department of State. The regional Councils, set up by the
The regional Councils were
FCMA,
federal
function · a s an intermediate level
and state governments.
between the
set up by the FCMA because the problems of fishery
management should be managed at a local level but no one
state is large enough to encompass the entire stock of
fish.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional breakdown, for fisheries purposes,
of the waters adjacent to the United States coast consists
of two bands of ocean which are controlled by either the
respective state governments or the federal government.
The Fishery Conservation Zone is measured 197 nautical
miles seaward from the territorial sea. This band is
supervised, in
Commerce. The
closing lines
an executive sense, by the Department of
territorial sea is measured from the
which separate the internal waters from the
territorial sea,
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the low water mark, three nautical miles
seaward and is controlled by the state governments.
Because Congress foresaw that contradictory and damaging
regulations could be adopted by the states in their
respective three-mile zones, it made provisions for
federal preemption of state regulations.4
REGIONAL COUNCILS
The FCMA set up eight regional management Councils
that function as an intermediate level of government. The
regional Councils include the Mid-Atlantic Council, the
South-Atlantic Council, the Gulf Council, the Caribbean
Council, the Pacific Council, the North Pacific Council,
the Western Pacific Council, and the New England Council.
The composition of the New England Council will serve as
an example of the composition of the Councils in general.
The New England Council has seventeen voting members:
the fisheries department head from each of the five
states, the regional director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS, a part of the Department of
Commerce), and eleven representatives appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce from lists of qualified individuals
4Three
occur: (1)
zone must
must take
the action
substantial
conditions are necessary before preemption can
a management plan for the fishery conservation
be in effect~ (2) the majority of the fishing
place in the Fishery Conservation Zone, and (3)
or inaction of a state must have had a
and adverse effect on the management plan.
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submitted by each state governor. Non-voting members
include representatives from the Coast Guard, the State
Department, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Marine
Fisheries Commission. Other regional Councils have
different non-voting members specified.
The FCMA requires that the Secretary of Commerce
appoint at least one of the eleven members at large from
each state in the region.5 In the New England Council,
the first appointments included four representatives from
Massachusetts, three from Rhode Island, two from Maine,
and the required one each from Connecticut and New
Hampshire.
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION
Of the eleven "qualified individuals" who were
originally appointed to the New England Council, ten were
industry representatives, and one was a university
professor. It is not surprising that so many were
industry related, because "the term ~qualified individual~
means an individual who is knowledgeable or experienced
with regard to the management, conservation, recreational
5Ibid.
Councils.
Sec. 302. Regional fishery management
or commercial harvest~
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of the fish resources of the
geographical area concerned. "6 By definition~ the members
of the Council will be people who have had enough
experience through their occupations to be considered a
"qualified individual."
Industry representatives of the New England Council
include processors~ dealers, commercial fishermen, and
recreational fishermen. It would be a mistake however, to
conclude that all industry representatives have the same
commercial interests and will vote as a block on all
issues. Some of the original Council representatives have
two or more constituent groups. For example, one member
owns fishing vessels and processes fish while another is a
dealer from a co-operative belonging to commercial
6Ibid. Sec. 302 (b) (1) (C). Voting members.
The process adopted for selecting a "qualified
individual" to serve on the Council reduces the
possibility of a consumer representative. A consumer
representative could oppose biological management
techniques that the commercial interests may champion
because the costs would be passed on to the consumer. The
fishery biologist or economist could then provide neutral
scientific evidence to resolve the conflict. Data
supplied by an economist could help resolve the conflict
between reducing costs for the consumer and keeping
fishermen employed. The elimination of a cost-cutting
technology always costs the consumer more money, even
though ' it may help stabilize the brood stock of fish. A
legally sanctioned regulatory body with only selected
special interest groups represented has the potential for
economic abuse of the consumer.
fishermen.
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The voting patterns will, therefore, skew
management plans in the best interest of the industry
group that has the greatist representation on the Council.
The Council is intended to be a self balancing microcosm
of the competing interests involved in fisheries.
COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITIES
The regional Councils have the task of developing a
management plan for each specie of fish in their
respective regions.7 "The regional Councils are designed
to maintain a close relation with those at the most local
level interested in and affected by fisheries management.
The Secretary of Commerce is given authority under the
bill to act as the > executi ve. > "8 When the regional
Councils began operations in 1977, there were
disagreements about whether the regional Councils were
advisory bodies for the Department of Commerce or separate
legislative bodies. The National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) stated in the operations manual that "it is clear
that the Councils have the primary role in development of
fishery management plans and that their role extends
beyond that of an advisory committee. "9 However, some
7Ibid. Sec. 302 (b) (1). Functions.
8Ibid. Sec. 304. Action by the Secretary.
members of the regional
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Councils feel that the Councils
are still treated like advisory committees. This feeling
is a result of the Councils forced reliance on NMFS data
to establish the Optimum Yield (OY) and of the legislated
power of the Secretary of Commerce to veto the Council
p I ans.
Management plans are developed by following a
specified sequence of information gathering and idea
formation. The Councils must first determine the
objectives to be met by the plan (explained later) and
obtain a figure for the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
based upon the best scientific information available.10
The NMFS in New England has the only scientificly
collected information to 'e s t a b l i s h the MSY, so the New
England Council uses the NMFS information. If thi s
information is biased, underestimating the stock of fish
or the MSY, it may result in allocation problems when a
smaller catch is divided among competing users.
The MSY for a particular species is modified into the
Optimum Yield (OY) through Council meetings and public
hearings by considering social, economic, and ecological
9U.S. NMFS, Operations Manual; Regional
Management Council, June 11,1976, p1-5
Fisheries
10FCMA Sec. 301 (a) (2). National
fisheries conservation and management.
Standards for
factors.
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Next, the Council must estimate how much of the
species the domestic fleet can take. The amount of fish
that the domestic fleet cannot catch, not exceeding the
OY, is the Total Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing
(TALFF).ll Finally, the Council must allocate the
domestic catch among competing fishermen by choosing
management techniques that are consistent with the
national standards.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RESPONSIBILITIES
On the national level the Department of Commerce
(DOC)
plans,
has the authority to approve the fishery management
promulgate implementing regulations, enforce these
regulations,
violators. 12
and determine the assessment of fines for
Because the fisheries management plans must
be prepared according to national standards, the DOC must
review fisheries management plans and veto them if they do
not meet the following national standards contained in the
FCMA:
(a) In General.-Any fisheries management plan
prepared, and any regulation promulgated to
implement any such plan, pursuant to this title
shall be consistent with the following national
11Ibid. Sec. 201 (d). Total Allowable Level
of Foreign Fishing.
12Ibid. Sec. 304. Action by Secretary.
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standards for fisheries conservation and
management:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall
prevent overfishing while achieving, on a
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall
be based upon the best scientific information
av~ilable.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual
stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
througho~t its range, and interrelated stocks of
fish shall be managed as a unit or in close
coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall
not discriminate between residents of different
states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or
assign fishing privileges among various United
states fishermen, such allocation shall be (A)
fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B)
reasonably calculated to promote conservation;
and (C) carried out in such manner that no
particular individual, corporation, or other
entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall,
where practicable, promote efficiency in the
utilization of fishery resources; except that no
such measure shall have economic allocation as
its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall
take into account and allow for variations
among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery
resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall,
where practicable, minimize costs and avoid
unnecessary duplication. 13
On the basis of these seven national standards and
the definition of Optimum Yield, the Secretary of Commerce
13Ibid. Sec. 301. National
conservation and management.
Standards for fisheries
must,
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after public hearings and all other bureaucratic
processes, either promulgate enabling regulations or send
the management plan back to the Council for amendments. 14
If the regional Council does not act within a reasonable
time, the Secretary may prepare his own fisheries
management plan.15 Also "if the Secretary finds that an
emergency involving any fishery resources exists, he may
promulgate emergency regulations ••• "16 The Secretary must
also "carry out any fishery management plan or amendment
approved or prepared by him, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act (the FCMA)."17 The FCMA states
that "the Secretary shall initiate and maintain a
comprehensive program of fishery research ••• "18
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
a section of the Department of Commerce, has a component
called the NMFS
supplies Council
The NMFS makes fish stock assessment,
support personnel, has a voting seat on
the regional Council, and assists the Coast Guard in
enforcing of the FCMA.
14Ibid. Sec. 304. Action by Secretary.
15Ibid. Sec. 304 (c). Preparation by the Secretary.
16Ibid. Sec. 305 (e). Emergency Actions.
17Ibid.
Secretary.
Sec. 305 (g) • Responsibility of the
18Ibid. Sec. 304 (e). Fisheries research.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES
The Coast Guard~ a division of the Department of
Transportation, is the primary enforcement division of the
FCMA. The enforcement activities include surveillance~
boarding, issuing of citations, and patrolling the zone for
domestic as well as foreign fleets. The Coast Guard also
has non-voting representatives on the regional Councils to
advise on enforcement matters and keep up to date on pending
regulations.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
The Department of State negotiates with foreign
governments to establish Governing International Fisheries
Agreements (GIFA~s). These GIFA~s include an acknowledgment
of the United States~ right to manage the fish inside the
200 mile fishing zone~ the right of a United States official
to inspect a fishing vessel at sea and seize it for
violations, the right to reciprocal fisheries agreements~
and the obligation to pay for enforcement costs. 19
The Department of State also must distribute the Total
Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing on a yearly basis to the
foreign nations that have signed GIFA~s. "The total
allowable level of foreign fishing, if any~ with respect to
any fishery subject to the exclusive fishery
--------------------
19Ibid. Sec. 201.~ Sec. 202.~ Sec. 204.
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management authority of the United States, shall be that
portion of the optimum yield of such fishery which will not
be harvested by vessels of the United States••• ".20 In its
allocation decisions the Department of State must consult
with the Department of Commerce and consider the following
items specified in the FCMA:
(1) Whether, and to what extent, the fishing
vessels of such nations have traditionally
engaged in fishing such fishery;
(2) Whether such nations have cooperated with
the United States in, and made substantial
contributions to, fishery research and the
identification of fishery resources;
(3) Whether such nations have cooperated in
enforcement and with respect to the conservation
and management of fishery resources; and
(4) Such other matters as the Secretary of
State, in cooperation with the Secretary (of
Commerce), deems appropriate.21
The State Department has also been designated the
coordinating agency between the Departments of
Transportation and Commerce concerning seizures of foreign
nation~s vessels when they are found in violation of the
FCMA.
This brief discussion of the roles played by federal
and local actors, and their obligations and
responsibilities indicates one reason for poor response
time in the management process. Sometimes a management
20Ibid. Sec 201 (d). Total Allowable Level of Foreign
Fishing.
21Ibid. Sec 201 (e). Allocation of Allowable Level
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strategy will develop by default, because the processes
required by law take so much time that other management
options can not be adopted in a meaningful time-frame.
For example,stonewalling in Council meetings has been
responsible for cod fishing closures resulting in uneven
burdens even though all the Council members oppose
closures.
Page 16
CHAPTER II: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
OWNERSHIP
Fisheries
utilizaton of
management involves balancing the full
fish with conservation in order to ensure a
brood stock and equitable allocation of the catch between
user groups. In his book The Management of Marine
Fisheries, John A Gulland states:
••• If fish resources were under single
ownership, management would raise few major
problems. There would be some scientific work
in advising on the best management policy, but
the great problems of reaching decisions on what
limits should be achieved, would be dealt with
as part of the complete procedure of managing
fish business, of which the fish resources would
be a major capital asset.22
Fishery managers who advocated national control of the
resource before the FCMA based their arguments on their
feelings that national ownership leads to rational
management. After the FCMA came into force, the fishery
managers continued to perceive the government as the sole
owner of the fish resources and advocated management
strategies based on that false assumption. Although the
government now controls the fisheries management, the
stocks are still considered to be common property.
Common property resources are held in trust by our
22J. A. Gulland, the Management of Marine Fisheries,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p.4.
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government for the general public and are the property of
the first person who reduces them to his possession.
Therefore, in the traditional sense of ownership, the
government does not own the fish in the sea. Management
can only be concerned with regulating the opportunities of
the public to reduce the fish to ownership, (catch fish),
without creating a privileged or restricted class of
individuals who alone are permitted to fish. Therefore,
the management of marine fisheries can not be based on any
theory that assumes that one individual, a restricted
class of individuals, or one government owns them. Who
then are the individuals that make up the unrestricted
class of people that benefit from conservation? This is a
political allocation process decided during the Regional
Council's meetings.
CONSERVATION OBJECTIVE
Fishery conservation is the planned management of a
natural resource in order to prevent over-exploitation or
destruction of fishery resources. In practice,
conservation guards or saves a species from harm or
change. However, the reason for this protection is so the
species can be used to enhance man's welfare. Presumably,
this works best on fish stocks that are not being
over-exploited to the point of extinction and whose
habitat is not significantly altered by man's activities.
Conservation moves the fishing occupation closer to
the idea of ranching the sea because it implies that it is
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wise to leave at least one bull and cow to produce a new
herd of cattle for the farmer~s future use. Most
fishermen do not oppose the concept of conservation but
there is considerable disagreement as to HOW MUCH
conservation
be practiced.
is necessary and HOW the conservation should
The controversy can be illustrated with an
excerpt from - the groundfish management objectives by the
New England Fishery Management Council:
Over the plan period expected the total
removals will be established on a yearly basis
consistent with the overall objective as
constrained by an acceptable probability of
achieving the biological stock conditions by the
end of the plan period, and a minimum spawning
stock level for each species which ensures an
acceptable probability of continued
recruitment. 23
Unfortunately, fishermen are utilizing a common
property resource where it is to their short term benefit
to exploit the fish stock to their maximum individual
ability. For instance, if a sport fisherman releases a
small fish in the hopes that it will grow, he knows that
the chance of his recapturing the fish is very small. The
sport fisherman also knows that if that fish is caught
again the next day, the other fisherman will probably not
release it. The "logical" conclusion is to enjoy the
small fish now and forget conservation. In some respects,
--------------------
23Ibid, p.l.
the individual
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fisherman is similar to the independent
sovereign state that seeks to maximize its power in the
world, through diplomacy or war, even though the action is
not in the long term best interest of either humanity or
itself.
FUTURE OPTIONS OBJECTIVE
The FCMA attempts to address the conflict between
harvesting more fish today and facing fewer options for
future harvests. A conservation objective contained in
the FCMA requires that fishery management maintains "a
multiplicity of options available with respect to future
uses of these (fi shery) resources. "24 This objective
could be useful in rejecting suggestions for fishery
management policies that could eliminate a species of
fish. For instance, at present neither the commercial nor
the recreational fishermen consider the sea robin as
anything more than a nuisance. However, a management plan
that eradicated the sea robin would preclude an as yet
unknown future use for the sea robin.
Another aspect of the "multiplicity of options"
conservation objective is the possibility of precluding
future harvests because a fish species is presently in
need of preservation.
--------------------
24FCMA Sec. 202.
Some groups interested in our
envi~onment would
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a~gue that a fish species whose
existence has been threatened through fishing or oil
pollution should be . preserved for its own inherent value
as a unique and irreplaceable creature.
Preservation is a more restrictive concept than
conservation because it means to keep or guard from harm,
injury,
man's
change,
rational
or interference,
utilization.
but it also excludes
P~eservation does not
maintain a "multiplicity of options" for future harvest as
required in the FCMA but it may be the only way to manage
some species. The best examples of preservation are on
land, where man has been able to exert more control over
animals for a longer period of time than in the oceans.
For instance, the buffalo of the Midwest was almost
extinct until preservation gave the herds a chance at
survival, even though their habitat is largely destroyed
by farms and highways. Some biologists would argue that
whales are in a situation similar to the buffalo and need
preservation in order to survive. One logical way to
determine if a fish stock is to be conserved or preserved
is to address the question of habitat destruction. If the
natural habitat has been altered to a point that continued
survival is doubtful, then the fish need preservation.
HABITAT PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OBJECTIVE
Contrary to popular concepts, the ocean is not a
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homogeneous mass of water. There are subtle differences
in the bottom material~ temperature~ salinity~ and other
physical parameters that create unique habitats for the
different creatures in the sea.
inhabit several unique niches
Frequently a species will
in the sea as the members
pass through stages in their life cycle. To destroy one
niche~ such as the estuaries used for the juvenile
nursery~ would threaten the survival of the entire species
not just the juveniles.
An e>~ample of one method of protecting fish
habi tatreproduction
hatcheries.
through
Extreme natural
enhancement would be
variation of year classes
coupled with untimely stock assessments create
uncertainties concerning the appropriate management plans.
Some management uncertainty could be removed if hatcheries
could insure a good harvest by supplementing the natural
reproduction. If the biologists could learn to raise the
the first stages~ which have highjuvienile
mortality
fish through
rates~ they would learn what the species'
specific niche requirements are. Unfortunately~ the life
cycles of most of the commercial and recreational species
are not completely understood, so it is difficult to
correlate an effect on the fish stock with an
environmental catastrophe, such as an oil blowout. The
information gained from research could be used to document
reasons for protecting specific habitats. The supply of
juvenile individuals would guarantee that the species
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would not become extinct. The security from extinction
would permit more latitude in other management decisions.
CONSUMER OBJECTIVES
Besides the commercial and recrational fishermen, the
consumer should be a benefactor of fisheries management.
Congress noted in the FCMA that fisheries provide food for
the nation but did not specify any other consumer
benefi ts. "For example, although it is a stated objective
that fisheries should be managed to assure a supply of
food, it is not stated that the quality should be high,
that prices should be low, and that supplies should be
secure. "25 There are very few people who advocate
fisheries management for the benefit of consumers and who
are interested eno~gh to attend Regional Council meetings
in order to secure a reduction in fish prices or prevent
the extinction of a species of fish.
The
illustrated
lack
by
of consumer interest is dramatically
the New England Fishery Management
Council 7s three page statement on management objectives
which includes only the following reference to consumers:
"In benefits to users we include incomes to harvesters and
processors as well as the values to consumers. "26 The
values to consumers are never defined and yet they are one
25John
Management
Conceptual
34.
E. Kelly. "The Fishery Conservation and
Act of 1976- Organizational Structure and
Framework~" Marine Policy (January 1978): p.
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of the groundfish management plan's purported objectives.
In an ideal management situation there should be a
group to oppose the special interests of the commercial
and recreational fishermen, such as a consumer group or an
environmentalist organization. For example, an effort tax
increases the variable costs of the commercial fisherman,
reduces the supply of marketable fish, and drives the
consumer price up. The fisherman can theoretically pass
the extra cost directly to the consumer and be relatively
unaffected. If the price to the boat is up, the dealers
represented on the Regional Council can justify a larger
markup so they will not oppose an effort tax on consumer
grounds.
Another example of clashing consumer and commercial
goals is seen in the conflict over employment and labor
saving technology. If a new, labor saving device were
adopted, the reduction in raw product costs would
theoretically save the consumer money, but the loss of
employment would not please the fishermen. For example,
on the United states West Coast, the Pacific salmon return
to their home rivers where one strategically placed trap
could capture the optimum catch in each stream with very
little effort and expense. However, it was determined
26New England Fishery
Recommendations for Groundfish
(July 28, 1978, p. 1-3.).
Management
Management
Council,
Objectives,
that the traditional
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salmon fishermen who captured the
salmon have little alternative employment and they would
become
permitted.
wards of the state if the fish traps were
Therefore the traps were prohibited, and the
fishermen continue to capture the salmon inefficiently.
Examples of restrictions on technology (probably the
oldest management technique) range from the sail powered
oyster boats on the Chesapeake Bay to the hand powered
clam hoes in Maine. Managers have justified these
restrictions on the basis of stock conservation, because
if a new, efficient harvesting method were universally
accepted the stock would be depleted. However, the real
reason is the managers~ inability to deal with the social
upheaval caused by the unemployment of a large number of
traditional fishermen who could not operate if the new
technology were permitted. Historically, in technology
versus employment conflicts where there is governmental
management, the employment considerations override
harvesting efficiency.
COMMERCIAL FISHING OBJECTIVES
According to the New England Regional Council,
"management~s ultimate aim is to generate the greatest
possible social and economic values to the users of the
resource. "27 One of the purposes stated in the FCMA is to
"promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing
--------------------
27Ibid, p. 1.
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under sound conservation and management principles."28
From this statement it is clear that the commercial and
recreational fishermen are classes of individuals who have
a special interest in conservation and management.
As well as shouldering an uneven management burden
the commercial fishermen lost some important traditional
values when .they curtailed their fishing in order to
comply with the FCMA. Among the traditional values listed
by fishermen are such things as beautiful sunsets and
sunrises, dynamic weather and sea conditions providing
challenge and variety to the job, the hunters skill in
finding his catch, and the seclusion from society forcing
self-sufficiency. The untraditional closures and quotas
have also restricted the fishermen's freedom to make
business decisions to maximize their incomes. This has
led to some marginal operators loosing their livelihoods
and has other fishermen considering some sort of
government-backed economic protection.
In the traditional fishery before the 200 mile limit,
when the fishermen competed with each other for fish and
markets, the marginal operators also went bankrupt but
government regulations were not to blame. Most fishermen
enjoy competing with each other, but they abhor government
28FCMA Sec. 2b Purposes.
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regulations that remove the opportunity to fish, compete
with each other, and succeed or fail through personal
ability. An ideal management technique, from a
traditional fishing point of view, would protect the
stocks from over-exploitation and leave the traditional
social and economic structure intact.
PROCESSOR OBJECTIVES
A well represented special interest group on the
Council is the fish processors or dealers. This group is
interested in management because their businesses need a
order to minimizeconstant
overhead
supply of
costs and
quality fish in
supply customers. However, it is
sometimes desirable for an industry to reduce the supply
to force the price up. For instance, the Mid-Atlantic
Council has limited entry, trip catch limits, and one day
a week trips restricting the surf clam industry. This was
supposedly done to conserve the stocks, but most of the
surf clam beds have never been harvested in New England.
In affect the regulations prohibit the development of the
New England resource because the increase in supply would
drop the dealers~ profit. As a matter of record, the
independent fishermen opposed these regulations but the
regulations through.
Mid-Atlantic Council has enough dealers to push the
From a dealer~s perspective, any
management plan which maximizes dealers profits is a good
one.
RECREATIONAL OBJECTIVES
A fourth special
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interest group that has some
both
is the
conflicting goals
the consumers
with the commercial industry and
recreational fisherman. The
recreational fishermen are a very difficult group to
regulate because historical catch records are
non-existent, and no one knows how much fish they catch.
To complicate matters, the value of fishing to
recreational fishermen is quite a bit more nebulous then
the value to commercial interests.
For example, what is a day on the water away from his
business worth to a business executive? How many
recreational fishermen should be allowed to fish in
competition with the commercial fishermen? In other
words, if the commercial fishermen are restricted, should
the recreational fishermen be restricted, and if so, how?
An ideal management technique would allow first come first
serve competition between the recreational and commercial
fishermen and still prevent over-fishing.
THE POLITICS OF OBJECTIVES
Closing a spawning area is politically sensitive
because fishermen from one state who catch fish only when
it is spawning would be excluded and forced to bear more
than their share of the management burden which is
discriminatory. When discriminatory management objectives
such as closures or quotas are considered, the geography
of Council voting power becomes a key issue. A market
will
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reward scarcities in one state with higher prices to
fishermen in other states. Therefore~ if more than 50% of
the Council members are from states not affected by the
closure~ a discriminatory closure could be a reality.
we see the possibility for discrimination.
representatives from Massachusetts and Rhode
Here again,
Together the
Island control 64% of the Council~s votes. If they were
inclined to~ they could force a management decision that
would be to their advantage and could be to the detriment
of the other states in the region. For example~ some of
the herring votes split geographically because Maine~ New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts gained resource distribution
to the detriment of Rhode Island.
For instance~ a law that closes the fishing season on
cod fish from May to August for all fishermen would not
on the surface seem discriminatory because it would apply
to all fishermen. But practically, it would exclude Maine
and New Hampshire fishermen on an economic basis, since
this is the time when cod run offshore near these states.
The makeup of these Councils is~ therefore~ important when
management decisions that could discriminate between
residents of different states are considered.
One of the responsibilities of the Secretary of
in the previous chapter is theCommerce
obligation
fisheries
mentioned
to ensure
management
all of
plan.
the Standards are met by a
Standard Four prohibits
discrimination on the basis of residency but as long as
the regional
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effect of the management plans seems
balanced, the federal overseers may ignore more subtle
forms of discrimination. For example, the New England
Council has used closed spawning areas and closed seasons
which have caused one group of fishermen economic hardship
and have only a minimal effect on other fishermen.
CONCLUSION
The management objectives of the FCMA should be set
up to jUdge not only the utilization and conservaton
issues but also the allocation issues. A good set of
management objectives should include the following
elements: a minimum brood stock size, a percentage of the
total catch for the commercial fishermen and for the
recreational fishermen, a minimum estimate of stock
assessment and enforcement costs, and a determination of
an acceptable increase in consumer costs.
The New England Regional Fisheries Management Council
groundfish committee addressed the question of groundfish
management objectives and produced the following
recommendations:
The overall objective of the plan shall be
to generate over the period of the plan the
greatest possible joint economic and social net
benefits from the harvesting and utilization of
the ground~ish resource, ensuring that by the
end of the period the relevant ground~ish stocks
shall be in a condition which will produce
enhanced and relatively stable yields ~rom the
groundfish fishery in future years.29
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A fisheries management objective is an aim or goal
that should benefit the consumer, the fish stocks, and/or
a special interest group. The motives of special interest
groups will contribute to the allocation procedures in the
management plans that are developed. Even if a plan
purports to be based on maintaining the Optimum Yield but
is intended to favor one state over residents of other
states, it could be adopted by the Council and accepted by
the u.s. Secretary of Commerce. Balancing the often
conflicting management objectives makes fisheries
management a difficult political process.
29New England Fisheries Management Council, p.2.
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OPTIMUM YIELD
The cornerstone of the FCMA is the requirement that
the Regional Council~s management deliberations establish
a specific amount of harvestable fish called the Optimum
Yield (OY) for each managed fishery.30 "The concept of
Optimum Yield is broader than the consideration of only
the stocks of fish. It takes into account the economic
well-oeing of the commercial fishermen, the interests of
recreational fishermen, the habitat quality and the
national interest in conservation and management of the
fisheries .....31 The following definition of OY in the
FCMA can be supplemented with information from the
Legislative History of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976:
The term ~optimum', with respect to the yield
from fishery, means the amount of fish that will
provide the greatest overall benefit to the
nation, with particular reference to food
production and recreational opportunities; and
which is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from such a fishery as
modified by any relevant economic, social, or
ecological factor.32
Optimum Yield is a concept which underwent
30FCMA Sec.
management plans.
303 (a)(3). Contents of fishery
31Legislitive History. p 1099.
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considerable development during the legislative process
leading to the FCMA. OY is defined as Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY the largest average annual catch) modified by
relevant economic, social, and ecological factors. It
seems clear from the definitions in both the Senate and
the House bills that "Optimum," "Optimum Sustainable
Yield," and "Optimum Yield" are the same concept. As the
title of this act states, the act~s purpose is to conserve
and manage the fish stocks off our coasts. The principle
of conservation is to provide a brood stock that will
maintain the fishery in perpetuity. This is done to
benefit the humans who are and will be harvesting the
fish. The term "benefit" was found by the legislature to
be more appropriate than the "largest economic return,"
as shown by the change in the wording of the Senate bill.
Senators Warren G. Magnuson and Ernest F. Hollings
"Optimum
largest
biological
determined
economic,
factors. 33
introduced Senate bill 961 which stated that:
Sustainable Yield" refers to the
economic return consistent with the
capabilities of the stock, as
on the basis of all relevant
biological, and environmental
This definition was later amended to be:
"Optimum," with r!?spect to the yield from a
32FCMA Sec. 3 (18). Definitions
33Legislative History. p. 731.
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fishery~ means the amount of fish (A) which if
produced~ will provide the greatest benefit to
the Nation; and (B) which is prescribed as such
by the appropriate Council and the Secretary on
the basis of the Maximum Sustainable Yield from
such a fishery as modified by any relevant
economic~ social and/or ecological factors.34
An important change in the wording is the deletion of
economic RETURN and the substitution of benefit.
Webster~s Collegiate Dictionary defines "return" as "the
value of profit from a quantity of goods~ consignment~ or
cargo coming back
mercantile venture."
in exchange for goods sent out as a
The word "benefit" is much less tied
to monetary terms. As it is defined by Webster~s~ "a
benefit is something that promotes well-being." In turn~
well-being is defined as "the state of being happy~
healthy~ or prosperous." Therefore the change of RETURN
to benefit expands the concept of OY to include
non-monetary values such as health and happiness.
Another significant change in the definition of OY
is the addition of "social" in the list of modifying
factors. Webster's defines "social" as a term "of or
relating to human society~ the interaction of the
individual and the group. Or the welfare of human beings
as members of society. " For example~ from a strictly
biological viewpoint the herring or sardines should be
allowed
caught.
to mature so that the maximum weight could be
If a fisheries management plan prohibits the
--------------------
34 I bid. p • 131.
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harvesting of juvenile herring~ fishing and eating habits
would change. First~ the fishermen who have been
the herring or sardines would no longer havestop-seining
employment. Second, consumers in the U.S. prefer the
juvenile herring to the adults, so their eating habits
would be modified. Because of these factors, the
management plans will probably continue to allow the
capture of juvenile herring as well as adults.
The last change in the wording of the definition of
OY removed "biological" from the list of modifying factors
and added MSY as the biological basis of OY. The MSY is a
number for the long-term average harvest from a fishery.
As such it only needs updating on a yearly basis and is
not dependent on the current size of the stock. The
modifications of the OY definition make it clear that only
the MSY should be used for the base of OY. To be sure,
the best scientific evidence must be used to establish
MSY, but only MSY can be used as a base for OY.
If Congress had intended biological factors to be
considered in the determination of OY they would have kept
"biological" as a modi~ying factor. Instead, Congress
includes "ecological" which is a broader term. The
addition of "ecological" expands the concept of OY even
further and makes it more flexible because the Councils
can legally consider more environmental impacts.
For instance~
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a dredging operation for harvesting
shellfish~ could accelerate erosion of adjacent beaches.
If the MSY for the shellfish was not exceeded~ there would
be no biological reason for prohibiting the dredging.
However~
ecological
dredging.
the erosion caused by the dredging is an
problem which may require the prohibition of
The inclusion of ECOLOGICAL instead of
BIOLOGICAL as a modifying factor for OY gives the Regional
Council the flexibility to deal with this type of issue.
The definition of
number 200 stated that:
Optimum Yield in the House bill
The term "Optimum Sustainable Yield" means a
yield which provides the greatest benefit to the
United States as determined on the basis of the
Maximum Sustainable Yield of a stock or stocks
of fish as modified by relevant ecological~
economic~ and social factors.35
When these bills were combined and passed into law
the definition of Optimum Yield changed:
The term "Optimum Yield," with respect to the
yield from a fishery~ means the amount of fish-
(A) which will provide the greatest overall
benefit to the nation~ with particular reference
to food production and recreational
opportunities~ and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of
the Maximum Sustainable Yield from such fishery~
as modified by any relevant economic, social~ or
ecological factor.36
The addition of the words "food production" and
"recreational opportunities" to the definition of OY
--------------------
35 I bid. P • 131.
specifies that
Page 36
both marine fishing activities have equal
importance. In the report of the Senate committee of
commerce there is a clarification
Optimum Yield.
of the concept of
In the past, most fishery management has sought
to achieve the maximum sustainable yieid from a
fishery. The maximum yield (primarily a
biological term) is achieved when the annual
catch from a fishery is at the highest level
without harming the reproductive ability of the
stock and which assures a similar level of
harvest in the next year. However, many experts
believe that use of the maximum sustainable
yield objective in fisheries management may lead
to substantial economic waste and may ignore
important environmental relationships between
stocks from which yields can not be maximized
simultaneously. It seems more desirable
therefore to adopt the objective of optimum
yield, defined to include the maximum yield as
the basic standard of reference, as modified by
relevant economic, social, and/or ecological
factors. However, the Committee does not intend
that these modifying factors would be used to
institute management measures which permit
Dverfishing on a continued basis. Although it
may be conceivable that a situation may occur in
which a yield higher that the maximum
sustainable might be defensible, this would seem
rare and should be only temporary. In almost
every other instance, the optimum yield should
be equal to or below the maximum sustainable
yield. It is intended that determining the
optimum yield for each fishery ought to be
within the discretionary powers of the Councils
and the Secretary.37
The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries submitted
the following discussion of Optimum Sustainable Yield:
36FCMA Sec. 3 (18). Definitions
37Legislative History. p. 676-677.
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The preceding concepts relate to the biological
wellbeing of the fishery. The concept of
optimum sustainable yield is~ however~ broader
than the consideration of the fish stocks and
takes into account the economic wellbeing of the
commercial fishermen~ the interests of
recreational fishermen, and the welfare of the
nati~n and its consumers. The optimum
sustainable yield of any qiven fishery or region
will be · a carefully defined deviation from MSY
in order to respond to the unique problem of
that fishery or region. It can not be defined
absolutely for all stocks of fish or groups of
fishermen, and will require careful monitoring
by the Regional Marine Fisheries Councils and
the Secretary of Commerce. While optimum
sustainable yield may have many complex
components, their quantification should not be
beyond the capability of the broad range of
individuals who will serve on the Councils,
supported by trained economists and marine
biologists. Optimum sustainable yield will, as
indicated above, employ a well understood and
time-proven concept of maximum sustainable yield
as its basis while allowing for other relevant
economic and social inputs. The Committee
believes that the careful balancing of roles and
responsibilities under the Act between the
Councils, the Secretary and the public will
ensure that these inputs are not distorted and
that optimum sustainable yield will achieve the
purposes of the Act.38
The concept of OY was invented during the
deliberations of the U.S. Legislature. The MSY was found
to be too restrictive in its definition to allow
flexibility in the fisheries management plans. Therefore,
the sole biological basis of OY is MSY. OY, however,
includes modifier.s to expand the scope of the Regional
Council's deliberations.
--------------------
The concept of Optimum Yield was
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38Ibid. p. 1099.
given statutory recognition because it allows flexibility
in the process of determining what amount of fish can be
reasonably removed from the fish stock without harming its
reproductive capacity.
have
In practice,
tested
the complex components of Optimum Yield
the abilities of the broad range of
individuals who have served on the Councils. Conflicting
goals of special interest groups on the Councils and the
ambiguous interpretations of the relationship between the
Maximum Sustainable Yield and OY have contributed to the
difficulties experienced in instituting the FCMA.
OY is not intrinsically a discriminatory concept, but
manipulation.
the political process of determining it is open to
For example, the Council wanted to exclude
foreign fishing of butterfish. According to the FCMA any
portion of the OY not caught domestically must be assigned
to the Total Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing (TALFF).
In order to reduce the TALFF the OY was set just above the
expected domestic catch leaving only a small TALFF. The
market for butterfish is almost entirely foreign, so if
the foreign demand could be filled by foreign fishing off
our coasts there would be no domestic harvest. There has
not been a clear domestic example of discrimination caused
solely by the selection of the OY but a similar situation
could occur.
The choice of tools to implement a Fisheries
Management Plan (FMP)
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is directly related to the OY~ the
amount of fish the Council intends to be caught. A low OY
leads to allocation issues which can and does create
uneven management burdens. A low OY could also be chosen
to force other members of the Council to agree to
unequitable management techniques to be included in a FMP.
In either situation the MSY is the sole biological basis
for OY prescribed in the FCMA. The biolgical methods for
establishing the MSY become important because if members
of the Council want to manipulate the outcome of the OY
deliberations they must manipulate the MSY.
chapter explains the biological basis of MSY.
The next
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CHAPTER IV. MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) , the starting point
or sole biological basis for OY, is a concept which is not
fully defined in the FCMA. For instance, the acceptable
confidence limits of MSY were not defined, and the
relationship -of MSY to one species or the whole biomass
was not specified. In the Federal Register under Guidance
for Regional Fishery Management Councils NOAA stated that:
The MSY from a fishery is the largest average
annual catch or yield in terms of weight of fish
caught by both commercial and recreational
fishermen that can be taken continuously from a
stock under existing environmental conditions.
A determination of MSY, which should be an
estimate based upon the best scientific
information available is a biological measure
necssary in the development of Optimum Yield.39
It is necesesary to understand the collection
process for the "best scientific data" if some conflicts
over the relationship of the OY to the MSY are to be
comprehended. The Maximum Sustainable Yield is a
complicated figure to calculate, but the theory behind it
is quite simple. First the fishery scientists figure out
how many fish exist in a stock and how much effort is
needed to catch the fish.
produced showing the
From these a graph can be
39United States Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Guidance for
Regional Fishery Management Councils (Tuesday, July 5,
1977). p. 34458.
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effort necesesary for the maximum catch. If the council~s
Optimum Yield deliberations start with a low MSY estimate~
the result will probability be a low OY. A low OY results
in allocation decisions which have burdened residents of
different states with uneven management costs. The
following is a discussion of how MSY is determined.
For each species the total population of fish is
called the stock. The stock constantly fluctuates~ due in
part to the entrance of young fish called recruits. These
recruits~ along with the other more mature fish~ grow with
time and increase the total weight of the stock. At the
same~ time there are fish dyeing from old age or being
eaten by other fish. This natural mortalit y is
distinguished from the fish that die because they are
caught by man. (figure one)
VIRTUAL POPULATION ANALYSIS
In order to harvest fish and conserve a brood stock
the magnitude of recruitment~ growth~ natural mortality~
and fishing mortality must be known (figure one). The
be estimated using the commercialfishing
landing
mortality can
statistics for data. The NMFS collects sampling
statistics on the age of the landed fish by counting the
number of growth rings on fish scales. The number of fish
of each year class is estimated using length/frequency
data. Over the life span of each age class the number of
fish removed by commercial fishing can be totaled. This
process is called cohort analysis or virtual population
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analysis and assumes that if the fish were caught by the
fishermen they must have existed in the first year of
recruitment.
Figure two gives an example of a virtual population
and clarifies this part of stock assessment.
certain unknown number of fishcrats were born.
In 1920 a
Because
all young fishcrats look like all other juveniles we
cannot tell which ones will be fishcrats. Jherefore, we
cannot simply count juveniles to determine the number who
will become fishcrats. But if we record the number of
dead fishcrats each year from the 1920 year class, as is
done in the row labelled (LANDED) in figure two, we can
total all the fishcrats landed each year. Common sense
tells us that if they dyed, they must have been there in
the beginning. The total dead is recorded in the row
labelled (TOTAL) • In 1921 there must have been at least
fishcrats alive. Two fishcrats dyed in 1922 leaving at
least 30 at the end of 1922. The pattern is followed
across the row labelled (REMAIN) • The graph below the
table shows graphically the virtual population always will
be lower then the real population because the landing
statistics cannot be used to estimate natural mortality.
Virtual population analysis is based on the
assumption that the catch statistics must be reasonably
accurate and that the natural mortality is known or
estimatable. Also a true estimate of fishing effort is
needed as the time series progresses, and the biological
characteristics such
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as length to age~ growth rates~ etc
must be
commercial
known. These assumptions are questioned by the
fishermen because they know from experience
that the catch statistics are incorrect. For instance~ I
was once unloading a boat full of whiting when the captain
was interviewed by a NMFS data collector. The captain did
not mention ·h i s whiting catch to the collector. When the
NMFS man left, all the fisherman had a good laugh; however
the false information was dutifully entered into the data
base which today forms the statistics for MSY. 'Th e
fishermen also question the accuracy of any estimate of
fishing effort. They know that a small change in fishing
gear can have tremendous consequences on the catch.
Therefore they conclude any estimate for effort or
potential effort is ludicrous.
While there is general agreement about the patterns
of growth used in calculating the virtual population, the
specifics are difficult and expensive to document. For
instance, it is known that if the adults which eat the
same food as the recruits are removed, the recruits grow
faster--presumably because they have more food. Also, if
a year class is exceptionally large~ the individuals will
grow slowly and mature late.
is like thinning a forest
In this case, early harvest
so the survivors can grow
better. Raising the OY in time would permit the early
harvest without jeopardizing the brood stock.
Inflexible management plans and enforcement
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procedures have led to discriminatory closures. For
example an exceptionally large year class of herring
supported a large summer fishery in Maine. A closure was
recommended by the NMFS because before the winter fishery
conducted by Rhode Island fishermen was started the entire
OY was taken in Maine.
If a year class is followed through its life cycle~
the number of individuals is very high at first~ but they
are rapidly eaten or die for other reasons. As the fish
•
get older~ they die at a slower rate. The weight of each
fish is low at the start but young fish gain weight
fish in a year class is multiplied by the
rapidly until
weight of a
maturity slows the process. If the average
number of fish in the year class~ the result is the total
weight of the year class.
relationships graphically.
AREA SWEPT CLEAN
Figure three shows these
Virtual population analysis by itself has a limited
usefullness because it can only be done on a year class
which has already been caught or dyed so all management
proposals will not change the lives of the fish which were
counted. However, a virtual population analysis can be
used as a check on the other stock assessment methods that
estimate the present abundance of fish. The "area swept
clean stock assessment method" is used by the NMFS ta
estimate the present abundance of fish.
The area swept clean method assumes that a biologist
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can tow a standard net through the grounds, that the fish
are evenly distributed over the bottom, and that his net
catches every fish which is in its path. The total number
of fish in the stock can be calculated by multiplying the
total area o~ the fishing grounds by the amount o~ fish
caught per unit area swept by the net. Figure ~our
depicts the . p r o c e s s o~ stock assessment using the area
swept clean method.
O~ course, any study is only as good as its
assumptions. Fish are not evenly distributed over the
fishing grounds and i~ only one tow were used the results
would be totally ~alse. However, the central limit
theorem from statistics states that the average of an
in~inite number of random samples o~ a nonrandom
population is the average o~ the population. It means
that a very large number o~ random tows must be made in
order to mitigate the errors introduced by the assumption
that the ~ish are evenly distributed over the bottom.
Fishermen sco~f at the number o~ samples used by the NMFS
as the basis o~ their data collection because they know
that moving only one hundred yards will sometimes triple
their catch. In statistical terms~ the fishermen are
saying that ~ish are in tighter schools of higher
concentration then the NMFS statistics show. This means
that the random samples made by the NMFS almost never
sample the high concentrations o~ fish, according to
professional fishermen. The scientists answer this charge
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by stating that the central limit theorem requires that~
if the results are to be of any value~ they must sample
randomly and use the average concentration. At this point
the scientist's credibility is so low that the fishermen
are certin that if a man were standing with one foot on a
block of dry ice and the other foot in a bed of hot coals~
the scientists would say that~ on the average~ the man was
comfortable.
Commercial fishermen would also disagree with the
assumption that all the fish in front of the net are
caught. For instance~ a fisherman from Point Judith Rhode
Island was fishing for butterfish alongside a group of
boats and catching about four thousand pounds per tow. He
then adjusted the sweep on the net by three inches (less
than three tenths of one percent) and caught nearly thirty
thousand pounds in the next and subsequent tows. The
other boats continued to catch about four thousand pounds
per tow. Fish catch rates are a function of the gear~ the
operating environment~ and the operator's skill. However,
the fishery scientist counters this charge by pointing
out that the trawl survey is compared against the virtual
population analysis to arrive at an index of sampling
efficiency. In other words, the fishery scientist is
saying that the commercial catch rates are used to check
or correct the results of the survey.
VIRTUAL POPULATION VERSUS AREA SWEPT CLEAN
The NMFS uses the virtual population analysis of past
year
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classes that had the same stock assessment level to
say that there are the same number of fish available for
future harvest as were available in the historical or
virtual population. Put another way, the area swept clean
survey is used only to determine the relative abundance
assumed to e>:i st today. This type of correlation reduces
the objections to the assumptions in the area swept clean
method of stock assessment, if the' survey is done
precisely the same way each year.
Fisheries biologists also estimate the future stock
by computing the amount of growth there will be in the
stock, the amount of recruitment, the fishing mortality,
the age ratios, and the size of the brood stock necesesary
to ensure a new year class. In fact, the computer models
are now being modified to include sociological data on the
When these complex computer models are
fishermen
management
in
p I ans.
order to estimate their responses to
complete, the fisheries managers will have an on-line,
real-time management information system that should be
capable of answering any question. Many fishermen feel
that computer modeling is a means to a secure future for
the scientists and statisticians, because if the computer
were asked if there is a God it would answer, "There is
now. " The average fisherman is not capable of evaluating
the precision or the applicability of these assessment
methods or the computer software used to manipulate it.
However, judging from their experience with the
Page 48
assumptions made in order to conduct stock assessments,
they generally disbelieve the scientific evidence.
FISHING EFFORT AND YIELD
After the size of the fish stock has been estimated,
the next step in determining MSY is to determine how the
stock size is related to fishing effort. The scientific
assumption is that the stock size is equal to the fishing
effort times a constant. This means if there are more
fish in the sea,
his effort and,
tDe fishermen will catch more fish for
conversely, the fewer the fish the lower
the catch. This seems to be a logical statement but the
underlying assumption of catch per unit effort must be
explored.
The number of vessels fishing times the number of
days fished is an estimate of effort exerted. In order to
make this calculation, the statisticians assume that all
fishing boats are the same size with the same power; that
the boats all tow /the same size net on identical fishing
ground with random fish density; that the net is towed the
same number of hours every day fished; and that the
captains and crews are identical. Even a casual observer
can see this is not correct, so the statistician creates a
formula to account for as many factors as possible.
However, fishermen point out that the human factors alone
can overshadow any vessel factor. A vessel may be an
excellent producer in a fishery in one area but may be
uncompetitive in another area or fishery.
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After the scientists calculate the amount of effort
exerted by the recreational and commercial fishermen~ they
need to know the yield or amount of fish caught by this
effort. This data is collected by NMFS data takers at the
port or is reported by the dealers. The reliability of
these figures in reflecting the real catch level is based
on a number of assumptions: that there are no fish sold
off the boats for unreported cash; that there is no
"shrinkage" taken out of the landing figure reported; that
the scales used to weigh the fish are accurately operated
by an honest person; that all the fish unloaded from the
boats are recorded; that the fish species is correctly
reported; and that there is no discarding at sea. Again~
the fishermen know from experience that these assumptions
do not reflect the real world. Yet this data is the basis
for "the best scientific evidence."
The effort/yield function (figure five) is the result
of combining the statistics on stock size~ effort, and
catch data. This type of relationship between catch and
populations such as a deer herds.all
effort is not unique to fish populations •
•exploited natural
It is found in
This unique situation of having the population hidden
below the surface of the sea creates more errors in the
collection of data. The error in fish stock assessments
is the sum of the error caused by inaccurate assumptions
and the error inherent in data collection systems. For
example the 95% confidence interval for cod fish is
graphed in figure six.
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The plus or minus 50/. may seem
e}~cessive, but actually it is a very good fish stock
assessment that can boast this accuracy. In layman's
terms, this means that if the catch of fish were watched
for one hundred years, the catch would vary plus and minus
50/. for ninty-five of those years. Instead of
recommending "that the NMFS data be ignored because of the
imprecision, the fishermen should realize that if the
statistician and fishery biologist can give the confidence
interval of the assessment, they have done the best job
possible with the given resources.
THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE
This process of establishing the effort/yield graph
and the MSY should be a purely scientific process devoid
of bias and politics. However, "the National Marine
Fisheries Service is ••. in a strategically advantageous
position to become the primary source of data which the
regional councils need to establish MSY."40 The FCMA
re~uires that the MSY be established using the best
scientific evidence available, and in most cases, the NMFS
has the only scientific data. Therefore, the NMFS has the
best scientific evidence. The regional councils are
responsable for establishing the OY. The FCMA defines OY
as a figure "prescribed as such on the basis of the
40John E. Kelley. "Organizational Structure and
Conceptual Framework" Marine Policy (January 1978). p34.
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Maximum Sustainable Yield .•.• ~41 MSY is therefore the
legal starting point for OY. However, at a reg i onal
council meeting, Richard Hennemouth, the then assistant
director of the NMFS Fisheries Center of Woods Hole,
stated that
e>:i sts. ~42
~for all practical purposes, MSY no longer
This statement is at the base of many of the problems
between the councils and the NMFS. It indicates that the
scientists are basing their management recommendations on
theories which are one step beyond the concept of MSY.
The scientific data that they have collected can be used
to establish the average catch of fish from the stock, or
it can be used to estimate the current level of stock.
Assuming there is an optimum brood stock level, the
scientist can also calculate the best level of removal
from fishing. This shift in data interpretation is a
shift in theory from maintaining a maximum catch to
maintaining an acceptable level of brood stock. The
fishermen want a maximum catch and the biologists are not
giving MSY calculations any credibility because MSY does
not agree with their current theory of fisheries
management.
The ultimate objective or result of the regional
41FCMA Sec. 3 (18). Definitions
42Richard Hennemouth. New England Regional Council
Meeting, Peabody Massasachusetts March 10, 1977.
Page 52
council's management deliberations is the establishment of
the OY for each species in the fishery. However~ to
establish OY~ the MSY must be established. Given the wide
confidence intervals, or large error in the MSY, it is not
difficult to understand the confusion when the regional
councils deliberate the social, political, economic, and
environmental modifications to a hotly contested MSY.
The MSY for a fishery is usually contested because ~
low MSY creates a low starting point for the OY. This
leads to a low OY, which the industry dislikes because it
restricts fishing. When fishing is restricted, there is a
potential for discrimination against residents of
different states. For example, the peak fishing season
occurs during different months for different states. When
a low MSY has led to a low OY and a closure of fishing is
the residents of the state that has its normalordered,
fishing peak concurrent with the closure is hurt
economically more than fishermen of other states.
CHAPTER V.
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MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES:
IMPACTS ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY
One economic theory asserts that societies best
interest is served when the maximum amount of fish is
caught with the minimum amount of effort. The underlying
assumption is that because the beneficiary of the common
property fishery resource is society at large the fishery
should be managed as if society owned the resource. In
order to distinguish economists believing in this theory
from others the term "our economist" will be used below.
When our economist assumes that the fish are under single
and that the biologists can formulate anownership
accurate relationship between catch and effort his
recommendations on how to manage the resource cause the
industry a great deal of consternation. As the
starting point for fishery economic, theory our economist
assumes that the stock assessment process gives an
accurate graph of catch-to-effort and that the fish are
owned by the government as the logical representative of
society. As mentioned earlier, the fish are held in trust
by the government for the general public, and ownership
does not start until they are caught. This ownership
assumption leads our economist to the conclusion that
rational fish harvesting should be based on the cheapest
way to catch them, as if they were owned by one owner.
The fishermen, on the other hand, point out that there are
thousands of fishermen who harvest the fish basing their
decisions on
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individual economic factors. An examination
of the industry economics will
conflict and the basic theory.
INDUSTRY ECONOMICS
clarify the points of
In order to examine the industry economics, it is
necessary to have a graph relating the catch to a unit of
effort, such ' a s the one shown in figure five. The concept
of ex-vessel price is introduced by multiplying the price
by the total catch. If this is done for each point of the
graph in figure five, the results can be graphed showing
the relationship between revenue generated and the effort
necessary to generate it (figure seven).
In order to quantify the effort, our economist would
introduce the concept 'of standard vessels. All standard
vessels have the same skipper and crew, the same power,
the same
detail of
hull,
the
the same fishing
vessels is the same.
gear; in short, every
The fishing industry
is assumed to be entirely composed of standard vessels.
The Council's fishing industry representatives are quick
to point out this is not true, but assume that through
work and luck, it can be done. The results can be graphed
(figure eight) using the vertical axis for dollars and the
horizontal axis for standard vessels.
EXPLOITATION OF A VIRGIN STOCK
The next graph shows an economist's view of what
happens in an industry when a virgin stoc k of fish is
h f " t t" The older fish., which wouldexploited for t e lrs lme.
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have been caught at an earlier time if the fishery had
reached a steady state~ are immediately available for
harvest. Temporarily, the catch rates will be high, so
the revenue curve also will temporarily be held high. The
extra revenue and profits will encourage standard vessels
to enter the fishery until the total cost curve crosses
the temporary
nine). The
total revenue curve (point
longterm or steady-state total
A in figure
revenue curve
indicates that a management plan should have restricted
the number of fishing vessels to the long term requirement
for harvesting the MSY (in this case approximately one
hundred and twenty). Our economist would then assert that
the same amount of fish could be harvested in the long run
and that society could use the capital which would have
been used to construct excess vessels for an alternative
investment.
In most cases the demand for fish and inflation has
increased the fish price. Assuming that the large fixed
cost portion of the operating expense will stay constant
over the short run, the total revenue curve will shift up
without a major cost shift (figure ten). If the price
increase is great enough, it will shift the total revenue
curve up so that even though the same fish could be
harvested with fewer boats, the cost and revenue curves
making a profit and that our economist's doomsday
will
still
intersect. To the fisherman, this means that he is
predictions are wrong.
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A CHANGE IN PRICE
The increase in price~shown in figure ten~ will
encourage new entrants into the fishery and cause
over-exploitation.
cause the total
Specifically an increase in price will
revenue curve to shift up and the
intersection of the total cost curve will shift to the
of new vessels encouraged into the fishery.
right.
number
This right-hand shift is proportional to the
Conversely~ a decrease in the price will force some
fishermen out of the fishery. Economists would argue that
the fishermen are mixing issues when they point out that
the increase in price will offset the decrease in catch.
Our economists would maintain that with a good management
plan the same amount of fish could be harvested using
fewer vessels.
COST CUTTING TECHNOLOGY
Our economist would also maintain that a new
cost-cutting technology would encourage an excess of
fishing vessels to enter the fishery. For example~ if a
vessel installs a Kort Nozzle~ the fuel consumption will
drop by ten per cent. The same amount of fishing at a
lower cost causes the intersection of the cost curve and
the revenue curve to shift to the right~ indicating to our
economist that new vessels will enter and cause excessive
harvesting capacity (figure eleven). Our economist would
recommend that a management plan should tax the excess
profits making the industry less attractive to new
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entrants.
CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT
A change in catch per unit effort occurs when a more
effective method of catching fish is introduced (figure
twelve). For example, the menhaden boats started using
airplane spotters, which direct the boats to the fish and
increase the · catch rate. The vessel could then make more
The total revenue curve shifted to
sets in a day and,
became more efficient.
consequently~ the standard vessel
the right, and~ from our economist~s viewpoint, the
existing fleet was suddenly too large to efficiently
harvest. the fish. To counter this, our economist would
either recommend a technology restriction or a limited
entry and buy back program.
VESSEL ECONOMICS
Our economist~s view is based on the assumption that
the fish are owned by one government and should be managed
through treating the industry as an individual. In the
maximize their own share of the wealth.
real world fishermen are individual businesses that
The fishermen~s
economic decisions, which in aggregate constitute the
industry, need better explanation in order to understand
the actual
hypothesized,
system.
and
A management technique can then be
the aggregate of the individual
reactions can be anticipated.
The economic system for a sixty foot trawler is
graphed in figure thirteen42. Once a fishing vessel is
constructed,
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it is locked into a system of relationships
between its cost of operation and the number of days it
fishes. This can only be changed by constructing a new
vessel or investing in a modification. In the short run,
or on a day-to-day basis, the vessel must operate
according to this system. The fisherman can only adjust
the number of -d a y s fished in order to adjust his income.
The average fixed cost (AFC) are calculated by
dividing the fixed costs (FC) by the number of days
fished. Fi ;·~ed costs (FC) are such things as mortgage
payments, docking fees, or license fees. All fL:ed costs
(FC) exist whether or not the vessel goes fishing.
The average variable costs (AVC) are calculated by
totalling such costs as fuel, ice, food, or gear repair
and dividing by the number of days fished. Variable costs
generally increase as the vessel is fished more days.
Labor would be a variable cost in most industries, but in
the fishing industry labor is a function of the gross
stock or landed value.
this case.
Therefore, it is not included in
The average total cost (ATC) is the sum of the fixed
(AFC) and variable cost (AVC). The marginal cost (MC) is
42The data
confidential basis
England fleet.
for
from
this graph
a vessel
was supplied on a
operating in the New
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total costs divided by the change in daysthe change in
fished.
Competition for scarce fish resources and poor
markets will tend to lower the vessel"s revenue curve
until the vessel is operating where its marginal cost
curve (MC) and its average total cost curves (ATC)
intersect. If the revenue is reduced lower than this
intersection point the vessel is not economically viable.
If the Regional Councils are considering a management
technique which causes one group of fishermen to shoulder
a larger share of the management burden then the
intersection of the marginal cost and the total cost curve
will indicate whether a vessel will fail under the new
regulations.
By using these calculations and graphs~ the minimum
gross stock for any particular number of days fished can
be estimated. This means that, for this boat~ if a
fisherman plans to fish for 225 days in a year he must
and vessel costs.
catch
labor
enough fish to gross $1020 a day in order to cover
A fisherman will plan his fishing
strategy according to the price and availability of fish.
Fishermen fish for money and not for fish. For instance,
if the price is fixed at thirty cents a pound, the
fisherman must bring in three thousand, four hundred
pounds in order to stay in business.
A FISHERY IN EQUILIBRIUM
This relationship between the number of days fished,
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the price per pound~ and the quantity of fish caught per
day is graphed in figure fourteen. The bottom graph shows
the relationship between catch and price for three levels
of fishing activity for our standard vessel. For e}~ amp I e ~
if a line were drawn from the price at thirty cents
horizontal across the page it will intersect the 200 day
curve at an - average catch of 3500 pounds per day. This
graph, along with the other two which were introduced
or limited entry,fees,
earlier, will be used as a tool to graphically compare our
economist"s views on management with the effect on the
industry.
REGULATION BY PERMITS OR FEES
Regulation by permits,
increases the fixed costs of operating a fishing vessel.
In the case of charging a fixed fee for management
control, it is easy to see how the fixed costs will go up.
In the case of limited entry, a cash value accrues to the
right to fish, thereby increasing the fixed cost. A
person who wants to enter the fishing business would be
willing to pay the current permit-holder money for the
right to fish. In order to finance the purchase of the
license or to forego the interest payments of the money in
a bank account~ the current owner must be earning a
premium using the license.
Consequently, the average fixed cost curve (AFG)
graphed in figure fifteen shifts up when a management
technique is used which increases the fixed cost of
operation.
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The average total cost (ATC> also shifts up in
direct proportion to the shift in the average fixed cost
(AFC) curve. The resulting shift upward and to the right
of the intersection point between the marginal cost (MC)
curve and the average total cost (ATC) curve indicates
that the vessel will tend to fish more days each year and
it must earn more revenue on each trip.
The increase in required revenue will
isoquant curve to shift up and to the right.
cause each
If it is
assumed that the price of fish is beyond the control of
the fisherman~ then the isoquant diagram indicates that
the vessel must catch more fish. From an aggregate of
these individual responses it can be concluded that the
industry would improve their technology in order to catch
more fish each day.
On the other side of the discussion there is our
economist who looks at the industry cost/revenue (TC/TR)
curve. He sees an increase in the slope of the total cost
line and a shift to the left of the intersection with the
total revenue curve. He would conclude that the
regulation by permits~ fees~ or limited entry should force
some vessels out of the fishery and decrease the fishing
effort. In fact~ some of the marginal operators would go
bankrupt and leave the fishery. But those who stayed
would be fishing harder and catching more fish. The net
effect would most likely be negligible in terms of fishing
effort and industry costs.
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Regulation by permits and fees cannot discriminate
between fishermen on the basis of residence unless they
are flat fees and there is a consistent disparity in the
size of vessels of the states. The change in the ratio of
fixed to variable costs is inversely proportional to the
size of the vessel. In other words, the small vessels
would pay a larger percentage of their potential revenue
for the privilege of having a permit to fish.
Standard Five prohibits a FMP which has economic
allocation as its sole purpose. Permits and Fees do not
reduce fishing effort so their sole affect is economic
allocation in favor of the large operator. Standard Four
prohibits discrimination against residents of different
states. If most of the vessels of one state are smaller
than another state's fleet, permits and fees would violate
Standard Four. The Regional Councils should be concerned
about both effects because permits and fee~ are at least
unfair to some segments of the industry.
REGULATION BY EFFORT TAX
Fisheries management regulations, through taxes on
fuel, ice, or the number of days fished, cause an increase
in variable costs. In affect, taxes of this type are
effort taxes, because a fishing boat would only pay them
when it engages in fishing.
visible to the fisherman,
Effort tax regulation is very
because the tax is paid every
day, so it would be politically unpopular and difficult to
enforce.
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With an effort tax, the average variable cost (AVe)
curve shifts upward (figure sixteen), and the marginal
cost (MC) curve shifts upward as a result. The
intersection between the marginal (MC) and average total
cost (ATC) curves shifts upward and to the left. This
means that the fisherman in our example will decrease the
number of days fished, but he will need an increase in
revenue each day he fishes. The isoquant curves will
shift to the right and upward just like the fixed cost
increase discussed earlier.
The isoquant curves show that the fisherman would be
forced to increase his daily catch, if the price is
assumed to be outside his control. The aggregate impact
of regulation by effort tax would be to decrease the
number of days fished, but increase the pounds taken each
day. It is unreasonable to assume that the fishermen
would not have already adopted any method which could
increase their catch. Although, these effects would tend
to cancel each other the real effect would be to force
some fishermen out of the business.
Our economist, on the other hand, sees an increase in
the slope of the industry total cost line and concludes
that an effort tax would be a rational way to decrease
fishing effort. Like the case with fixed cost regulation,
some of the marginal operators would fail, but those le~t
in the industry would develop more efficient ways of
harvesting fish. Although our economist would not view
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this as an undesirable trend, he may question why society
should force technological changes with a technique that
is only marginally effective at reducing fishing effort.
Effort tax regulations would change the ratio between
the fixed and variable costs, such as the fixed cost tax.
The overall effect would be to favor the under 60 foot
vessel. ThebO to 100 foot vessels would be hard hit, but
the 100 foot plus would have only a minor disadvantage.
This means that Standard Five may be violated, but
standard Four is not, unless there is a disparity in the
size of vessels between the states.
REGULATION BY QUOTAS
Regulation by quotas does not affect the individual
boat~s cost curves or the industry cost and revenue
curves. The impact of quotas is on the isoquant curve.
Figure seventeen shows that if a vessel is given a total
quota, it theoretically could fish 200 days and catch 2750
pounds per trip. As long as the price is 39 cents per
pound it could make a living. Another theoretical
strategy would be to elect to catch 11,000 pounds per trip
with the price at 18 cents per pound. However , in reality
the size of a days catch can not be controlled by the
fisherman. Therefore, a quota system determines not only
the amount of fish available but also the price that must
be paid for the fisherman to survive and the number of
fishing days. A quota is perhaps the most untenable
management device because the fisherman loses all ability
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to adjust his income.
In practice the fishermen have been able to evade the
quota by landing fish that are claimed to be caught inside
three miles or by landing in several ports. Another trick
is to sell cad for haddock or pollack and nat record the
sales properly. In essence, quotas remove the freedom of
a ~isherman -t o operate his vessel at its most e~~icient
rate, unless he commits a criminal act. The use o~ quotas
,h a v e also nat attained the Council~s management objective
of conserving the resource.
If the catch from the Fishery Conservation Zone is
taken evenly throughout the year by the fishermen from one
state and in a short season in another then quotas would
violate Standard Four. Seasonal catches are caused by the
migration patterns of the fish as they react to seasonal
changes in food, temperature, etc. and not by the type of
fishing vessels involved. With a trip limit, fishermen
from some states are economically excluded from specific
fisheries because in a short season the catch is often
very high, and a trip limit would nat allow a high enough
catch to average with the low off-season catch. In the
off-season, any limit would be high enough because the
fishermen can nat catch fish anyway. Consequently, this
fisherman cannot afford to fish the species in the
traditional season so he will fish for the next best
specie and his net profits for the year will be reduced.
Contrast this effect with a fisherman who fishes
steadily year round and
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is able to bring in his limit
periodically~
a traditional
economic exclusion caused by a quota on
leanevery trip. In
the
catch
a
can
fishing year which occurs
force fishermen from one state
into bankruptcy without forcing all fishermen into
bankruptcy. If this effect is not discriminatory then
quotas are not
violated.
discriminatory and Standard Four is not
REGULATION BY CLOSED SEASON
Regulation by closed season affects primarily the
choice to fish the right number of days for each vessel.
In the example shown in figure eighteen~ the season is
closed after 100 days of fishing. This does not alter the
cost curves for the vessel~ but it does fix the cost per
achieve while operating on his own.
day fished at a higher rate than the fisherman would
In practical terms
this means the fisherman must pay his fixed costs in fewer
days of operation than he did before the closure.
Assuming that the fisherman cannot increase the amount of
fish he catches every day~ the only possibilities of
remaining profitable are to fish for something else or
have a substantial increase in the price.
A closed season fixes the number of days for a
fisherman to operate in a fishery and consequently fixes
the isoquant line for each fisherman"s operation. The
price is fixed Qutside a fisherman"s control and the catch
per day is fixed by the environment. This means that a
the target
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fisherman has no way of responding to the fluctuations in
the operating factors except by changing
species or getting out of the business.
If a species is regulated with a closed season, the
market will be flooded with fish during the open season
and the prices will be depressed until the season is
the fishermen
closed. When the season is closed the prices soar, but
ca~not go fishing. This causes excessive
capacity in fishing vessels and in the processing sector,
which remains idle during the off-season. Consumers
require a constant supply of fish if they are going to
maintain or expand their use of fish. A closed season
eliminates this possibility and decreases consumer demand.
Consequently a closed season causes the price for the fish
to decrease.
The short term effect of a closed season is to force
fishermen to continue fishing for an alternative species.
This means that the alternative species will have too many
vessels depending
regulated as well.
on it for survival and it will soon be
The fishcrats would assume that if all
the species are regulated some of these vessels would
become marginal and get out of the industry. In fact in
the short term this would happen, but in the long term the
size of the vessels would reduce in order to align the
intersection· of the marginal cost curve and the revenue
curve with the number of days available in the season.
The number of vessels would increase and the fish stocks
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would be once again overfished. Unfortunately~ the new
small vessels would not be competitive if the closed
seasons ended so removing the closures would be
politically unpopular.
The economic hardship caused by closures is more
damaging to the fishermen from some states than from
others. This would happen if the closure occurred in the
high catch season of one state and in a low or average
catch season of another state. The residents of one state
would be effectively stopped from participating in the
fishery.
The seasonal migrations of fish stocks cause the
fishermen from different states to fish for different
species at different times of the year. The fishermen
must catch the closest fish to his port~ the fish which is
in season or the most plentiful at the time~ and the fish
with the best price in order to be competitive with other
fishermen from other countries and states. A closed
season of the species of fish which is traditionally
caught will cause the fisherman to travel farther from
port~ fish on the next most plentiful fish~ and have one
less choice in the price category.
This means that his average costs will increase and
his average revenues will fall. This double-edged squeeze
will ensure that he is less competitive than. his
counterpart in another state who was not eliminated from
the fishery by a closure. In those lean years the
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fishermen from the states where the closures eliminate
them will go bankrupt before their counterparts in other
states. If this is not a discriminatory effect then
closed seasons are not discriminatory and do not violate
Standard Four of the FCMA.
REGULATION BY RANDOM CLOSED AREA OR MESH SIZE
The type of regulation that would please the
fishermen would not affect his personal set of economic
curves. It would instead affect the industry wide cost
revenue curves. Examples would be mesh restrictions~ hook
size limits~ or random closed areas. A discussion of the
random closed areas will clarify the economic consequences
as well as the social implications of this type of
regulation.
The concept of random closed areas may be compared to
a checker board~
fishing grounds.
such as a loran-c grid~ placed over the
Every other square would be closed to
fishing. The size of the closed areas could be adjusted
to respond to natural fluctuations in the populations of
fish. The system would work by reducing the catch per
unit effort experienced in the industry (figure nineteen).
The first effect is to shift the total revenue (TR) curve
to the right. In response fishermen would spend more days
at sea and the industry total costs (TC) would increase
and shift the curve to the left. Both shifts indicate the
resource would be conserved. However, the individual
vessel~s cost and isoquant curves would not change. There
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is something to be said about a system that forces a
fisherman to leave the system because he could not
adequately compete rather than because the rules were
unjust. Contrast that to a system which does not allow
the traditional fishing adjustments~ or imposes direct
economic pressure on the fisherman.
An advantage to this type of management is its ease
of enforcement. Aside from the fact that the fishermen
could report violators because the rules are easy to
understand, the
area in order
Coast Guard
to check by
need only fly over a closed
\
air if the fishing gear is
deployed.
install
Another way to enforce the closure is to
loran-c digital tape recorders that could monitor
the boat~s engine performance as well
position to prove a violation.
as the boat~s
Mesh size or random closed areas do not change the
existing economic system that the industry is used to. If
it is practiced carefully and only the adults are
harvested after they reproduce once~ this type of
regulation could achieve all the standards set forth in
the FCMA. In particular Standard Four is not violated
because no discrimination would take place on the basis of
residency.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary~
techniques:
there are five categories of management
(1) t th t l"n c r e a s e the fixed "The methods of managemen a
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costs of the fishing vessels are permits~ fees~ and
limited entry. Fixed cost management techniques probably
do not violate Standard Four but they have economic
allocation as their only effect which may violate Standard
Five.
(2) The methods that increase variable costs are effort
fish more days per year and try to catch
taxes on days
the industry to
fished or a fuel tax. Effort taxes force
more fish each day. Therefore~ they are ineffective tools
to regulate the fisheries.
(3) The methods that interfere with the price and catch
relationship are quotas and subsidies. These techniques
cause an uneven burden of management costs. If the uneven
burden forces some fishermen out of a business then these
management techniques appear discriminatory.
(4) the methods that fix the time spent fishing are closed
seasons or end of season quotas. This group of management
techniques have the same effect as those mentioned in
section (3).
(5) The last category is methods which affect the industry
revenue cost curves.
vessel restrictions,
These include gear restrictions,
size of fish limitations, and closed
areas. This category has the least discriminatory effects
and will eventually be accepted as the only way to fairly
manage a fishery.
Politically speaking, the fishery biologists prefer a
system of management which includes limited entry, but
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they would be satisfied with quotas and closed seasons if
the OY were not raised every time there is a closure.
,
Economists will push for limited entry and feel the mesh
regulations and closed areas are useless. The fishermen
do not like the quotas and closures and would prefer
techniques which affect the industry cost revenue curves.
CHAPTER VI.
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DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
This chapter attempts to answer the following basic
questions: (1) Does a management technique violate
Standard Four by discriminating against residents of
different states? (2) If the management technique does
not violate Standard Four, should the Secretary of
Commerce and the Regional Fisheries Management Councils
take corrective action to avoid uneven management burdens?
The Secretary of the Department of Commerce has been
empowered to ensure the fisheries management plans are
consistent with the seven National Standards set forth in
section 301 of the FCMA of 1976. Although all seven
Standards are of equal weight for legal purposes, Standard
Four is of primary importance in this paper. Standard
Four prohibits discrimination of fishery management plans
between residents of different states. Examination of the
legislative history will help clarify the meaning of
discrimination in this context.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall
not discriminate between residents of different
States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or
assign fishing privleges among various United
States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A)
fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B)
reasonably calculated to promote conservation;
and (C) carried out in such a manner that no
particular individual, corporation, or other
entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges43.
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DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION
The key word in this Standard is "discriminate."
Websters defines "discriminate" as "to make a distinction
in favor of or against one person or thing as compared
with others." Then, Standard Four prohibit~ management
techniques which make a difference or distinction between
residents of· different states. Standard Four also has
instructions as to how to prevent discrimination. If the
management plan is "fair and eq'-:litable to all such
fishermen," "promotes conservation," and ensures that no
"entity acquires an excessive share," then it is not
discriminatory.
BLATANT DISCRIMINATION
There are blatant examples of discrimination in
fisheries regulations, as exemplified in the Douglas vs.
Sea Coast Products lawsuit. The case was the result of a
Virginian law that excluded all fishermen except its
residents from participating in rt h e menhaden fisheries
inside its state waters. The decision declaring the
Virginian law unconstitutional was unequivocal evidence
that laws excluding persons from a fishery on the basis of
residency were discriminatory. The first sentence in
Standard Four from the FCMA clearly prohibits this kind of
blatant discrimination.
43FCMA Sec. 301 (a) (4). National
fishery conservation and management.
Standards for
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INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
However,
identified if
disrimination is not always as easily
the statute does not explicitly exclude
fishermen on · the basis of residency. For example, there
is a law in Maine that prohibits lobster fishing on
Sunday. Both part-time and commercial fishermen are
included in the law, but the effect is to make it
impossible for an out-of-state weekend fisherman to tend
his traps. The part-timer is effectively excluded, and
the commercial operator is hardly even inconvenienced.
The uneven management burdens caused by fisheries
management plans in the Northeast is not explicitly based
on the residency of the fisherman. However, fishermen are
affected differently because of their geographic location
or ~esidency. The differential economic impact of
closures between residents of different states is severe.
In order to address this issue on a statistical
basis, the catches of fish were collected on a monthly
basis for thirteen years prior to the FCMA. The important
species were assumed to be cod, haddock, and yellowtail,
because they are the first groundfish to be regulated
under the FCMA. Although these species do not migrate
over thousands of miles like birds, fishermen have found
that each species has a harvesting season for each
geographic area.
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Any management technique which
interfered with the harvesting season in one state and not
in another would cause an uneven management burden.
COD FISH CYCLES
For instance~ the harvest of cod fish occurs in
cycles which are out of phase between the statesmonthly
of Rhode Island~ Maine, and Massachusetts. The average
of yearly harvest for each month shows this cyclicpercent
effect (figure twenty). The phases of these monthly
cycles become important when fishery regulations imposing
quotas or closed seasons are considered for inclusion into
management plans. If the cod catch is closed in March,
the Rhode Island fishermen would be cut off from their
most productive cod fishing for the year. If the closure
were to occur in June, the Maine fishermen would be
excluded from one of their best fishing months. Although
Massachusetts accounts for eighty six percent of the total
cod fish caught in the New England area, the importance of
the catch to the Maine and Rhode Island should not be
underestimated (figure twenty-one).
Regulation by quotas would also have serious
detrimental effects on the fishermen from Rhode Island and
Maine. Because of the cod fish cycles, the catches of cod
are highly variable between the states (figure twenty).
will
This
on
means that if quotas set daily catch or trip limits
the fishermen, the state where the fishing is seasonal
not be able to catch enough fish during the season to
average with
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the off-season catches. The average revenue
from cod in Maine and Rhode Island would be significantly
lower so these fishermen simply could not compete with the
Massachusetts fishermen. This problem is not as serious
for the Massachusetts fleet because fishing for cod is
more constant there. Even the practice of weekly quotas
will not cor:rect the system~s inequities between the
indicate a double penalty.
states.
The economics of
Island
cod fishing in Maine and Rhode
First~ because the
fishermen cannot fish for large catches in season, the
average catch per day is reduced. This means the fish
must sell at a higher price if the fishermen are to
survive.
twenty-one)
However, it is clear from the pie chart (figure
that fishermen from Maine and Rhode Island
receive less for their fish than their counterparts from
MassachLlsetts. Regulation by quotas or closed season will
economic impact on Maine and Rhode Islandhave a greater
fishermen. Maine~s fishermen depend on a larger
percentage of their catch being cod than those fishermen
from Rhode Island~ so Maine~s fishermen are at an even
greater disadvantage when quotas or closures occur.
Of the three other categories of management
techniques~ increases in the average fixed cost or average
variable cost do not discriminate between residents of
different sta~es because their action is primarily an
economic one . and does not depend on harvest rates. The
management
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techniques that only affect the industry
revenue and cost curves, such as closed areas, do not
differentially impact these states. This is because these
techniques do not control the number of days fished or the
amount of fish caught by a vessel during any part of the
season. In other words, a fisherman can fish as long and
as hard as he wants without interference provided that he
is not fishing with a small mesh or in a closed area.
HADDOCK CYCLES
The differential impact between residents of
different states due to cycles in haddock catches is
different from cod because the prices of haddock are
higher for the states with the highest variability in
catches and the phases of the seasons are different
(figure twenty two). The same problem exists for haddock
which was discussed for cod; that is, if closed seasons
are used to regulate the fishing industry, there are
differential
states.
impacts between residents of different
Again, Maine and Rhode Island are the states that
would be impacted more than Massachusetts. Examination of
the pie charts in figure twenty three indicates that Maine
will be more severely impacted than Rhode Island. The
quotas on haddock also prevent the Maine and Rhode Island
fishermen from catching the large hauls which are
necessary to average with the losses in the off season.
YELLOWTAIL CYCLES
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Yellowtail flounder are caught primarily by
Massachusetts and Rhode Island fishermen within the data
collection area. Even though the Maine catch is graphed
in figure twenty four~ the thirteen year average catch for
Maine was less than one half of one percent (figure twenty
fi ve) and the Standard deviation is greater than the mean
for the perc.entages caught. This means that when Maine
fishermen catch yellowtail it is highly unusual and not an
important part of their fishing revenue. When the catch
curves for Massachusetts and Rhode Island are compared~
they are very similar. Therefore there would be no
serious differential impacts between these states if the
yellowtail regulation included quotas and closed seasons.
However~ yellowtail are very seasonal in New York and New
Jersey and these states were not included in the data base
for this thesis; so discrimination from quotas or closed
seasons can not be proved or disproved for these states.
ECONOMIC HARDSHIP
It is evident that fisheries regulations that use
quotas and closed seasons do cause an uneven management
burdens on fishermen which is more severe in some states
than others. Careful examination of the legislative
history of the FCMA helps to clarify whether or not the
second half of
discrimination.
Standard Four prohibits this type of
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESIDENTS
Discrimination is defined as a distinction~ made in
favor of
Page 80
one person or group over another. In order for
discrimination to exist, some form of distinction must be
made between the fishermen in the region. In his report
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Senator Magnuson
states "since there will be pressures on the state
representatives to protect the residents of their home
state, nothing will destroy the effectiveness of this new
management program more than if one state, or group of
states, attempts to favor their own residents to the
detriment of others. "45 Senator Magnuson saw that even
though the fishermen fish the same stock of fish, the
political
fishermen.
grouping of people into states distinguishes
UNJUST DISTINCTION
The definition of discrimination also states the
distinction must be unjust. "Just" is defined as morally
right or good, and having a basis in or conforming to fact
or reason. Unjust must be the inverse of just, or not
morally right or good, and not having a basis in or
conforming to reason. Senator Magnuson gave the following
hypothetical example which he felt was discriminatory:
"If, for example, the most efficient area to
catch fish during their migration is near the
coast of Rhode Island, New Jersey fishermen
should be allowed an equitable portion of catch
if they also fish the same stock. "46
In both Magnuson's example and the case of quotas or
closures, the inequities are caused by the migration of
fish, the fishermen are distinguished by their residence
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in different states, and they are harvesting the same
stock of fish. In the view of Senator Magnuson, an unjust
distinction between residents like a closure or a quota
which caused uneven management burdens based on residency
is discriminatory.
CONCLUSIONS
The objectives which are chosen for the fisheries
management plans will be affected by the politics of the
institutions involved in the management process. Special
interest groups represented on the Regional Councils will
affect the determination of the Optimum Yield. It has
been shown that imprecise data collected and presented by
the NMFS has affected the OY because the concept of MSY
was interpreted to mean a minimum brood stock.
I t has al so be.en shown that quotas and closed seasons
prevent some fishermen from harvesting their traditional
share of fi sh. It has also been shown that, although this
is an unintentional side effect of management through
quotas and closures, it could be avoided by using a
different management technique such as random closed
areas. Therefore, regulation by quotas and closed seasons
constitutes an unjust and avoidable distinction between
residents of different states. Simply put, quotas and
45Legislative History. p. 686.
461bid. p. 686.
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closures discriminate against fishermen on the basis of
residence which is explicitly prohibited in Standard Four.
The Regional Councils have consider uneven management
burdens when they deliberate the pros and cons of each
management technique but there has been no concensus on
how they affect fishermen. Although legally speaking only
the blatant discrimination such as that in the Douglas vs.
Sea Coast Products can easily be proven unlawTul~ the
second halT OT Standard Four indicates that the allocation
process may produce undesirable or inequitable side
eTTects which should be avoided iT possible. In all but
the industry catch per unit eTfort category the variation
in harvest seasons between states cause uneven burdens or
discrimination between residents OT different states or
have other undesirable secondary eTTects. ThereTore~
Tisheries management should rely upon management
techniques like random closed areas and mesh regulations
iT uneven burdens are to be avoided.
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Figure 5 ;
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Figure 7
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Figure 8
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Figure 10
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Figure 14
AFISHERY IN EQUILIBRIUM
20
10
30
Milliins
~ 50 INDUSTRY COST-REVENUE
AVC
ATC
MC
AFC
VESSEL COSTS
100
100 200 300 Days 100 200 300 Vessels
Price 00 0 +)0 ISOQUANT DIAGRAM FORtV ~$1.00 PRICE TO CATCH SU8STlTUTION
.90
.80
.70
.60
.~O
.40
.30
.20
.10
10 20 30 40 ~O 100 I~O
Catch in Hundreds of Pol,lnds
Page 99
Figure 15
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Figure 16
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Figure 17
REGULATION BY QUOTAS
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Figure 18
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Figure 19
REGULATION BY CLOSED AREA
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Figure 20
COD FISH CYCLES
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Figure 21
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Figure 22
HADDOCK CYCLES
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Figure 23
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Figure 24
YELLOWTAIL CYCLES
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Figure 25
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